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T his paper examines the key role of infrastructure in Andean 
Community trade patterns, using three gravity models. The first identifies 
the importance of preferential trade agreements and of geographical 
adjacency. The second and third models encompass these aspects 
while focusing on the inclusion of infrastructure in the gravity equation, 
testing the assumption that infrastructure endowments reduce “distance” 
(in terms of transport costs) between partners. Under the new trade 
arrangements, borders and previous agreements will lose significance, 
trade will be virtually free and bilateral flows will be defined in terms of 
costs and competitiveness. Competitiveness, however, can be achieved 
only by means of an improvement in infrastructure at all points in the 
production-distribution chain.
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This paper offers further evidence that infrastructure 
development is a source of integration and competitiveness 
and shows the dynamic role played by infrastructure in 
explaining and determining trade flows within and 
outside the Andean Community.
The work is organized as follows. The following 
two sections set out the framework for the analysis. 
Section II briefly reviews the evolution of what is now 
the Andean Community since it was formed in 1969 
as the Andean Pact, focusing on the consolidation 
of the internal market and the group’s trade pattern. 
An augmented gravity model of bilateral trade flows 
is applied to yearly data for 1993-1999 in order to 
determine whether the Andean Pact helped to increase 
trade within the region and to capture the effect of 
adjacency on trade among its members. Section III 
discusses the first gravity model. Section IV looks at 
the role of infrastructure in trade, reviewing theoretical 
and statistical evidence that location and resource 
endowments play a conclusive role in determining 
whether countries will decide to enhance their trading 
opportunities by developing infrastructure to reduce 
transport costs. It then briefly reviews the transport 
modes employed in Andean Community trade.
Section V, where the effects of the degree of 
infrastructure development are fully assessed, is the 
core of the paper. We go beyond a traditional gravity 
model to discuss the notion that transport costs 
are not only a function of distance but also of the 
availability of proper means, such as roads, energy 
and telecommunications networks. These variables 
are summarized in an index measuring infrastructure 
development in the countries examined, modifying the 
distance variable. The analysis sheds light on the role 
played by infrastructure and its impact on the relevance 
of other explanatory variables. We then link the results 
to the new concept of infrastructure development in the 
region, in which the relationship between infrastructure 
and geographical space is regarded as a key integration 
and competitiveness tool. Lastly, section VI offers 
conclusions drawn from the work.
 Renato Flôres acknowledges the hospitality extended by the 
Institute of Development Policy and Management of the University 




How the Andean Community has evolved
What is known today as the Andean Community dates 
back to 1969, when a group of countries signed the 
Cartagena Agreement, also known as the Andean Pact, 
in which they established a customs union for the next 
10 years.
Since then, Andean integration has come through 
a series of stages and the initial inward-looking 
development project, based on the import substitution 
model, gradually gave way to an initiative more 
akin to open regionalism. In June 1997, the Andean 
Community came into being with the Trujillo Protocol 
modifying the Cartagena Agreement. The Protocol 
created the Andean Presidential Council and a Council 
of Foreign Ministers, affording both a critical role 
in decision-making. It also strengthened the internal 
cohesion of the integration process by placing all the 
Community’s institutions and mechanisms under the 
management of the Andean Integration System. The 
Andean Community is now a regional organization 
endowed with international legal status. Recently, some 
friction has arisen among its five members —Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela— and this last country has opted to follow an 
independent course. At the same time, Mexico applied 
for full membership of the group. These developments, 
however, fall outside the scope of this paper.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 0  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 6 45
TRADE AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY  •
GINA E. ACOSTA ROJAS, GERMÁN CALFAT AND RENATO G. FLÔRES JR.
In 1987, the members of the Andean Community 
began to design a new strategy to keep up with the 
liberalization process taking place in Latin America. 
A free trade area was formed in 1992 and evolved 
into an imperfect customs union. As early as 1992, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Colombia 
eliminated tariffs and other barriers to reciprocal 
trade. Bolivia joined them in September 1992 and 
Ecuador in January 1993, when the free trade area 
became fully operational among these four countries. 
Peru temporarily suspended its obligations under 
the liberalization programme, beginning, in 1992, 
to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with each 
of its Andean partners and, in some cases, partially 
liberalizing reciprocal trade flows. These bilateral 
agreements remained in place until 1997, when an 
agreement was reached for Peru’s gradual incorporation 
into the Andean free trade area (Decision 414). Tariffs 
were eliminated on most goods by 2000, with “sensitive 
products”, including agricultural goods, to be totally 
liberalized by 2005.
In 1994, the Common External Tariff (CET) 
was approved by Decision 370. Its implementation, 
however, has run up against the typical difficulties. 
When Decision 370 was made, Bolivia was exempt 
and Peru, as noted above, was not participating in the 
process. Here again, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and Colombia were the first two countries to adopt the 
CET in 1994, followed by Ecuador in 1995. The Andean 
CET is determined by level of processing: a rate of 5% 
is applied to raw materials and industrial inputs; rates 
of 10% and 15% to intermediate inputs and capital 
goods, respectively; and 20% to final goods. The CET 
average is 13.6%, with a 20% ceiling. Bolivia and Peru 
are becoming gradually incorporated into the customs 
union, which already encompasses Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador. Full adoption 
was expected in 2005.
The Andean Community has addressed most of 
the newer trade issues, such as investment, competition 
policy, services and intellectual property rights and it 
has adopted common policies in most of these areas.1 
It has also taken steps to deal with the question of 
infrastructure, the focus of this paper. Furthermore, the 
Community is aware that the development of a common 
foreign policy is a main objective and involves the joint 
participation of all its members in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and in negotiations concerning 
regional agreements.
In 2004, the Andean countries formed a market 
of over 121 million people distributed over an area of 
4.7 million square kilometers. Their combined GDP 
that year stood at US$ 317 billion. The main markets 
for their exports are the United States, the European 
Union (EU) and the Community itself.
Liberalization of the internal market has had an 
important impact on trade among its member countries. 
Trade flows have reached unprecedented levels, with 
intraregional trade growing faster than trade with the 
rest of the world. After a decade of flat or declining 
growth in the 1980s, intra-Andean trade picked up in 
1989 and grew steadily after 1990. At the end of 2004, 
intra-Andean exports amounted to US$ 7.4 billion, 
nearly three times the 1992 level. Equally importantly, 
Andean trade with the rest of the world has also risen; 
imports and exports from and to countries outside the 
Community have increased steadily since the agreement 
was reactivated in the early 1990s.
Though there is a commitment to establish a 
Common Market, as noted earlier, the Community is 
still an incomplete customs union, since both the CET 
and the FTA are subject to a number of exceptions.
1 For example, Decision 291 replaced Decision 24, which restricted 
foreign direct investment activities, granting national treatment to 
foreign investors and eliminating all restrictions on capital and profit 
remittances. Decision 344 granted patent rights to pharmaceutical 
products and Decision 351 addressed copyright issues.
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In order to create a framework in which to analyse 
the growth of trade among Andean countries, we first 
constructed the following gravity equation:
 (1)
where: Mij is the value of country i imports from 
country j; YiYj is the GDP of both countries multiplied 
as a proxy for size; Dij is the distance between 
country i and country j (to capture trade costs); ACP 
is a dummy to measure the impact of integration on 
member countries’ trade (it takes a value of 1 when 
both countries are Andean Community members and 
0 otherwise); and Border is a dummy to measure the 
impact of adjacency (it assumes a value of 1 when the 
countries have a common border).2
The analysis encompassed the period 1993-1999, 
since integration gained momentum after the formation 
of the free trade area in 1992, with the aim of testing 
the significance and value of the agreement’s impact 
on intraregional trade. The countries on the left side of 
equation (1) are the five Andean Community members 
and those on the right are their partners, i.e., suppliers 
or exporters. The partners selected are those that have 
bilateral trade with members.
Data on trade flows, in millions of current United 
States dollars, were obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2001). GDP data, in current 
dollars, are from the World Bank Global Development 
Network Growth Database3 and the distance between 
capital cities, in kilometres, was obtained from 
Haveman’s web page.4
Individual regressions were run for each year 
based on equation (1), following a descriptive analysis 
of the data, which led to the transformation of imports 
and GDP by natural logarithm and distance by square 
root. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) were employed, 
with the transformed data on imports as dependent 
variables. A number of countries in Asia and Africa 
that did not trade with the Andean Community were 
removed in each year.
The results, in standardized coefficients, together 
with the R2 for each regression and the significance 
of the coefficients, are shown in table 1. The gravity 
equation performs well in explaining bilateral trade 
between the Andean countries and their respective 
partners. The global adjustment of the regression is 
satisfactory, since the R2 values are higher than 0.70. 
In all cases, the independent variables had the expected 
sign and were statistically significant according to F 
and t-tests.
The effect of the multiplication of the countries’ 
GDP is positive and statistically significant, ranging 
between 0.862 and 0.901. These values are consistent 
with those found by Frankel (1997) and Echavarría 
(1998) for the periods 1965-1980 and 1986-1995, 
respectively, though slightly higher owing to the 
fact that size plays a more important role in trade 
nowadays and, of course, that the partners chosen for 
each analysis are different. The coefficients bear out 
the assumption that trade increases with economic 
size and, in the case of the Andean countries, this has 
a strong effect on their trade.
The distance coefficients have a negative sign, 
are statistically significant and show values between 
-0.443 and -0.345. Distance has less impact than GDP, 
however. The value and sign of the distance coefficients 
are also similar to those found by Frankel (1997) and 
Echavarría (1998). Both authors worked with a period 
before the liberalization of transport services and the 
reduction of costs, so their coefficients are, in most 
cases, higher than those found in this work, when the 
distance effect had diminished.
The coefficients for the preferential agreement 
dummy fluctuate between 0.101 and 0.160. Their 
statistical significance (p-values) improves from 1995 
onwards and they evolve positively, albeit at low levels 
III
A first gravity model
2 Frankel (1997) used gravity models to show that regionalization 
could be explained by geographical proximity and preferential 
trade agreements; Krugman (1991) formalized the role played by 
geographical proximity in the regionalization process and since 
then dummy variables have been used to simulate and analyse these 
effects; Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) offer a more recent and 
stronger theoretical support for all this.
3 www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.html.
4 www.haveman.org.
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(figure 1). It is important to recall that the free trade area 
took effect only in 1993 and that Peru remained outside 
the agreement until 1997. In addition, a large number 
of exceptions leading to the application of different 
regulations diluted the influence of the agreement. The 
impact of the Pact may be expected to become more 
powerful as regulations are more uniformly applied by 
all partners. The positive evolution of the coefficients 
and their significance gains reflect the fact that, with 
the exception of 1999, member countries have been 
trading increasingly among themselves. The year 1999 
saw numerous economic and political crises, including 
the macroeconomic and banking collapse in Ecuador, 
the political problems in Peru that led to the flight of 
President Fujimori and flooding in Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela. Overall, our empirical results show that 
the Pact and the free trade area had a positive impact 
on trade among member countries.
The dummy for adjacency is used to establish 
whether common borders, which enable trade in those 
areas, do in fact increase trade flows. The coefficients 
for this dummy are positive and statistically significant, 
though their values are low and tending to decline. 
The positive values confirm that countries with a 
common border will trade more, but the low values 
and the non-positive trend suggest that these economies 
are relatively small and may trade more with larger 
economies, even those that are geographically more 
distant. Importantly, the reason adjacent countries do 
not engage in more border trade often comes down to 
poor transport infrastructure and difficult geographical 
conditions. In this regard, the Andes mountain range 





 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
YiYj 0.897 * 0.862 * 0.896 * 0.882 * 0.901 * 0.867 * 0.865 *
Dij -0.435 * -0.403 * -0.443 * -0.413 * -0.377 * -0.347 * -0.345 *
D ACP 0.102 * 0.101 * 0.128 * 0.155 * 0.159 * 0.143 * 0.160 *
D Border 0.200 * 0.161 * 0.129 * 0.124 * 0.127 * 0.116 * 0.139 *
No. observations  141  243 240 255 247 261 235
R2 0.82 0.722 0.755 0.752 0.780 0.714 0.769
Source: authors’ estimates.
* Significant at 5%.
FIGURE 1
Evolution of the ACP dummy
Source: Estimates prepared by the authors on the basis of the data shown in Table 1.
Years
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1. Trade, infrastructure and regional integration
Since Krugman (1991) recalled the importance of 
geography to trade, several authors, including Hummels 
(1998), have attempted to measure the effect of distance 
and the role of infrastructure in a bilateral trade model. 
A number of empirical works, such as Porojan (2000), 
have used investment data as a proxy for infrastructure. 
But the use of investment data to estimate infrastructure 
capital can present problems, as Summers and Heston 
(1991) argued. The effectiveness of the same investment 
flow may vary from one country to another, owing to 
differences in public sector efficiency and in the prices 
of infrastructure capital.
Bougheas, Demetriades and Morgenroth (1999) 
sought to examine the role of infrastructure in a bilateral 
trade model and in determining the cost of transport. 
According to their findings, a pair of countries in 
which infrastructure investment is optimal will exhibit a 
directly proportional relationship between infrastructure 
endowment and volume of trade. Consequently, 
variations in transport costs among countries may 
account for differences in their ability to compete in 
international markets. Furthermore, differences in the 
volume and quality of infrastructure may account for 
differences in transport costs and, hence, variations 
in competitiveness. As a result, reducing the cost and 
improving the quality of transport systems improves 
international market access and stimulates an increase 
in trade.
There is categorical evidence linking improvements 
in transport services and infrastructure in general to 
improvements in export performance. Hummels (1999) 
estimated that for every reduction of 1% in shipping 
costs, exporters will enjoy a market share gain of 5%-
8%. Limão and Venables (2001) calculated that the 
elasticity of trade flows with respect to the trade cost 
factor is approximately –3. Their research into the extent 
to which transport costs depend on geography and 
infrastructure found that differences in infrastructure 
account for 40% of the variation in transport costs 
for coastal countries and up to 60% for landlocked 
countries. Wilson (2003) showed that trade performance 
gaps among the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
countries were attributable to substantial differences in 
the quality of their transport infrastructure and level of 
logistics and trade services. This study concluded that 
upgrading the transport and service infrastructure of the 
lagging countries would substantially boost trade.
Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehman (2002) 
examined the role of economic and geographical 
distance for a number of MERCOSUR sectoral exports 
to EU. Their findings reveal that geographical distance, 
defined as the physical distance in kilometres between 
capitals modified by an infrastructure index, has a 
negative impact on trade. Transport costs increase 
with distance but may be reduced by infrastructure 
improvements.
The real costs of trade, including transport and the 
costs of doing business internationally, are important 
determinants of a country’s ability to participate in the 
world economy. As Limão and Venables (2001) pointed 
out, remoteness and poor transport and communications 
infrastructure isolate countries and limit their capacity 
to participate in international production chains. Any 
strategy aimed at increasing a region’s international 
competitiveness must include improvement of the 
channels that facilitate the exchange of goods and 
services and the movement of people.
In terms of regional integration, as noted by the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB, 2000), geographical 
interaction creates flows that do not necessarily circulate 
freely, but do so through infrastructure networks. 
These networks provide the physical support for flows 
to circulate: they cannot be a positive influence on 
integration and development without an appropriate 
legal and institutional framework combined with 
efficient infrastructure-related services. Moreover, like 
the integration process itself, infrastructure networks 
constitute regional public goods (IDB, 2004) and 
therefore require joint, coordinated action from all the 




in the Andean Community
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2. Andean Community trade by mode of 
transport
In order to determine the variables that affect transport 
costs in members’ intra-community trade, it is important 
to analyse the modes of transport used. Table 2 shows 
trade information by mode of transport within the 
Andean Community. Between 1997 and 1999, intra-
community exports were delivered mainly by road 
—nearly 49% of the value traded. Maritime transport 
occupied second place, with around 38% of the total 
value traded, and air transport took third place with 
approximately 8% of the total.
TABLE 2
Andean Community: intra-community 
exports by mode of transport, 1997-1999
(Percentages of export value)
Mode of transport 1997 1998 1999
Road 49.5 51.0 45.7
Sea 38.5 36.5 39.9
Rail 0.5 0.3 0.7
Air 5.7 8.7 9.2
Multimodal 0.1 0.0 0.0
Waterway 5.6 2.9 4.4
Others 0.0 0.6 0.1
Source: www.comunidadandina.org
In 1997, road transport was the main delivery 
method for Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Colombia and Ecuador. The proportion of maritime 
transport increased in Ecuador in 1998, likewise in 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 1999. Between 
1997 and 1999, 48% of Venezuelan exports were 
delivered to other Andean countries by road and 
39% by sea. Of Venezuela’s imports from its Andean 
partners, 62% arrived by road and 29% by sea. In 
this period, 55% of Colombian exports were delivered 
by road and 35% by sea, while the proportions of its 
imports arriving by road and sea were 60% and 33%, 
respectively.
In common with other Community members, 
Peru uses mainly maritime transport for all deliveries 
to non-bordering partners, since inland transport is 
expensive and slow in such cases. Shipping is the 
Andean countries’ traditional method of delivery for 
trade with geographically distant partners such as the 
United States and EU and is therefore the second most 
important mode of delivery to and from the Andean 
region. Nevertheless, in most cases, goods carried 
by sea must also be transported over an additional 
inland stretch by either road or rail at both origin and 
destination. Bolivia’s landlocked position makes it 
the prime illustration of this point. For both exports 
to and imports from non-bordering countries, Bolivia 
usually combines shipment to or from a Chilean port 
with inland road transportation (Andean Community, 
undated).
Generally speaking, the Andean Community 
members do not engage in inland waterway transportation 
because the areas where it would theoretically be 
feasible lack well-developed corridors. Moreover, 
the locations of the counties’ business clusters often 
preclude transport modes other than road and sea.
Air cargo is relatively limited: shipping merchandise 
by road is quicker, especially between bordering 
countries. Also, road transport is the delivery mode 
with the most expedite border crossing.5 Air cargo 
involving partners outside the Andean region is limited 
and confined to highly perishable goods.
Between 1997 and 1999, border trade among the 
members represented 98% of intra-community trade by 
road and 49% of total intra-community trade. Trade in 
road-freighted goods among non-bordering members 
was thus limited. As table 3 shows, Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Colombia have a very significant 
road-freighted border trade, accounting for around 66% 
of all trade of this type in the subregion. Trade between 
Colombia and Ecuador comes in second position, with 
slightly over 23%, and trade between Bolivia and Peru 
occupes third place (8%), though nearly half of all 
trade between these two countries —during the same 
period— was carried by road. The lowest level occurs 
between Ecuador and Peru, with only 2% of the total 
value carried.
In the late 1980s, the lack of infrastructure and 
the limited relevance of the Andean Pact meant that 
having a common border was extremely important for 
all the members’ trade. Trade was conducted at borders 
and there was less interest in more distant trading, 
because logistics and transport services were few and 
expensive. At that time distance was certainly crucial 
and borders marked out natural trading partners. In 
the 1990s, however, the significance of border trade 
decreased considerably, as the coefficients for the 
dummy in model (1) show.
5 Personal discussions with the firm ZaiMella del Ecuador S.A, which 
operates export-import activities in most of the Andean Community 
member countries.
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1. Model specification and data
The results of model (1) showed that economic size 
(GDP) is probably the most important variable in the 
choice of trading partner and established that distance 
plays a decisive role in cost. Nevertheless, the absolute 
value of the distance coefficients declined throughout 
the period, suggesting that other factors, apart from 
physical distance, may be affecting transport costs (and 
therefore trade) in the Andean region. Indeed, given that 
the economic size of bilateral partners did not change 
dramatically within the period examined, no borders 
were altered and the basic structure of the Pact was 
unchanged, transport cost and the associated factors 
represent the variable that calls for further analysis.
Based on the literature described in point 1 of 
section IV, we built an augmented gravity model in 
which physical distance is modified by an infrastructure 
index, i.e., a geographical distance centred on the 
interaction of geography and infrastructure, to determine 
the effect of infrastructure on trade. In this model, 
transport costs are a function not only of distance but 
also of the availability of public infrastructure, such 
as roads, railroads, energy and telecommunication 
networks. These public infrastructure dimensions are 
summarized in an index that measures the degree of 
infrastructure development in the countries, modifying 
the distance variable.
Rewriting equation (1), bilateral trade is thus 
modeled as:
 (2)
where Mij, YiYj, ACP and Border are the same as in 
equation (1) and GeoDij is the distance between country 
i and country j modified by the infrastructure index.
The analysis takes a cross section for the period 
1985-1995.6 The reporting countries are again the five 
Andean Community members, with partners selected 
by levels of trade with the Andean countries and the 
TABLE 3
Andean Community: intra-community border trade by road, 1997-1999
(Millions of dollars)
Bordering country of destination 1997 1998 1999 1997-1999 %
Bolivia to Peru 143 120 68 331 4.50
Colombia to Ecuador 353 360 198 911 12.38
Colombia to Peru 7 2 0 9 0.12
Colombia to Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 802 847 688 2 337 31.77
Ecuador to Colombia 336 269 207 812 11.04
Ecuador to Peru 23 11 13 47 0.64
Peru to Bolivia 92 91 84 267 3.63
Peru to Colombia 3 1 2 6 0.08
Peru to Ecuador 64 34 14 112 1.52
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) to Colombia 982 1 073 470 2 525 34.32
Total 2 805 2 807 1 744 7 357 100.00
Source: www.comunidadandina.org.
V
Evaluating the infrastructure effect
6 The time difference in relation to model (1) was conditioned by 
the availability of infrastructure data.
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availability of information on their infrastructure 
endowment. Since the model retains the dummies 
for the Andean Pact and border effects, it continues 
to capture the importance of the preferential trade 
agreement and the significance of a shared border when 
the infrastructure variable is introduced.
Data on bilateral trade flows and GDP were taken 
from the same sources as before. The geographical 
distance variable is similar to that used by Martinez-
Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2002) and Limão and 
Venables (2001). It is defined as the physical distance 
between trading partners’ capital cities (obtained 
as before) divided by the sum of the two countries’ 
infrastructure indexes. The index, which is explained in 
the appendix, was based on five variables: kilometres 
of highways, of paved roads and railways, telephone 
mainlines and kilowatts of electricity generating 
capacity.
Annual data on physical infrastructure stocks for 
the reporter and partner countries for 1985-1995 were 
taken from David Canning’s 1998 Database of World 
Infrastructure Stocks.7 Canning reports two data types: 
raw data with a minimum of manipulation, basically 
as they appear in the original sources, and processed 
data with some kind of interpolation (assuming 
exponential growth over the intervening period, for 
instance). As recommended by the author, the index 
was calculated using the processed data because of 
their inter-temporal consistency for empirical work. The 
data on population and country area used to normalize 
infrastructure stock were obtained from the World Bank 
Global Development Network Growth Database and the 
Country Watch web page, respectively.8
2. Empirical results
In model (2) separate OLS regressions were run for each 
year, with the natural logarithm of members imports 
as dependent variable. Again, a number of Asian and 
African countries that did not engage in bilateral trade 
with the Andean Community were removed from the 
sample.
The results (in standardized coefficients) for each 




Andean Pact, 1985-1995: first gravity model including infrastructure. Empirical results
(Standardized coefficients)
Year ln YiYj ln GeoDistance Andean Pact dummy Border dummy R
2 n
1985 0.744 * -0.252 * 0.007 0.410 * 0.677 125
1986 0.729 * -0.250 * 0.021 0.384 * 0.664 129
1987 0.743 * -0.243 * 0.032 0.374 * 0.666 131
1988 0.780 * -0.211 * 0.041 0.390 * 0.717 134
1989 0.727 * -0.244 * 0.080 0.371 * 0.653 133
1990 0.773 * -0.206 * 0.170 * 0.386 * 0.692 140
1991 0.798 * -0.228 * 0.243 * 0.349 * 0.735 132
1992 0.791 * -0.256 * 0.159 * 0.371 * 0.757 135
1993 0.786 * -0.245 * 0.197 * 0.339 * 0.777 143
1994 0.750 * -0.256 * 0.227 * 0.307 * 0.728 146
1995 0.718 * -0.293 * 0.237 * 0.264 * 0.712 151
Source: authors’ estimates.
* Significant at 5%.
8 See www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.html; www.
countrywatch.com.
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from 0.653 to 0.735 for the period 1985-1991; between 
1992 and 1995, they are higher than 0.712 in all cases. 
Hence, the gravity equation adequately explains the 
bilateral trade of the five Andean Community members, 
especially in the second part of the period, reflecting 
the increasing application and importance of the 
preferential trade agreement.
Here again, economic size is the most important 
variable. This not only confirms the findings already 
presented but coincides with those offered in most 
empirical works. Nevertheless, notably, economic 
size (the multiplied GDP of each pair of countries) 
has a somewhat smaller effect when infrastructure is 
incorporated into the equation. Although the partner’s 
purchasing power is the first requirement to engage 
in trade, the smaller GDP effect found in this second 
model confirms that the infrastructure stocks of both 
member and partner reduce the distance between them. 
By reducing transport costs, such endowments reduce 
the prices of the goods traded and make them more 
accessible, thus shortening the economic distance 
between markets. Throughout the period analysed, 
GDP coefficients are statistically significant, positive 
and show no significant variation from one year to 
another. They range between 0.718 and 0.791, similarly 
to those found by Echavarría (1998) and Frankel (1997) 
in previous empirical work on the Andean Community 
though, again, higher.
The Andean Pact dummy was not significant before 
1990. Until the 1990s, import substitution policies and 
inward-looking regionalism shaped a non-operational 
agreement rife with exceptions, since members did 
not fully comply with its requirements: they all applied 
high tariffs and multiple non-tariff measures. The results 
for the Pact dummy confirm that the preferential trade 
agreement did not influence trade among members 
before market-oriented reforms set the groundwork 
for boosting integration efforts. Unfortunately, in 1992, 
despite the creation of the free trade area, the crisis in 
Peru led the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to freeze 
diplomatic relations with that country. As a result, 
Peru temporarily suspended its obligations under the 
liberalization programme. These developments detracted 
necessary political support from the Community and 
brought about a decline in trade among members, as 
confirmed by the drop in the dummy coefficient, though 
this trade remained significant. Since then the values 
have shown a positive trend, indicating the consistent 
enforcement of the agreement.
The new values for the Pact dummy are also 
higher than those obtained before the incorporation of 
infrastructure endowments into the model.9 Inclusion 
of infrastructure endowments not only lessened the 
distance effect but also strengthened the role of the 
preferential trade agreement. The combination of 
appropriate infrastructure and continuous building of 
regional integration on different fronts will certainly 
continue to influence intra-community trade in a 
positive manner.
The border dummy not only showed statistically 
significant results throughout the period, but gained 
importance as a trade determinant. As with the previous 
dummy, the inclusion of infrastructure heightened the 
importance of borders. All coefficients were above 
0.620, about twice as high as those found in model 
(1), for the corresponding years (1993-1995). The 
importance of borders in Andean Community trade is 
consistent with the fact that nearly 50% of the trade 
within the subregion is road-freighted and 98% of road 
transport takes place in border areas, as noted earlier. 
However, one of the most important traits of the results 
for this variable in model (1), the decreasing trend 
of the coefficients, is maintained in model (2). Until 
1992, the coefficients present higher values, indicating 
that a common border had a stronger influence on 
trade than the existence of a trade agreement which, 
though signed, was yet to be fully enforced. These 
higher values also reflect two additional issues: the 
poorer infrastructure and the greater cost resulting 
from delivering merchandise other than by road. After 
1992, when the free trade area became operational 
and maritime transport costs decreased to affordable 
figures in terms of transit and frequency, shared borders 
became less important and the coefficients approached 
the levels posted by the geographical distance and Pact 
dummy coefficients.
The geographical distance coeff icients were 
statistically significant and negative, confirming that 
transport costs, as represented in the model, reduce 
trade. The results also support the theoretical framework 
mentioned earlier, insofar as infrastructure endowments 
reduce bilateral distances. The geographical distance 
coefficients are roughly half those obtained from 
9 In this subsection and the next, assertions on the relative sizes 
of the same coefficients in different regressions (either in different 
models for the same year, or the same model in different years) are 
supported by the appropriate significance tests. To avoid encumbering 
the text, these results are not included; they are, however, available 
from the authors.
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proxying transport costs by physical distance alone.10 
From 1990 onwards, they show a positive trend. This 
pattern is the opposite of that encountered when physical 
distance alone was used, revealing that the distance 
variable became more important as competition for 
transport services increased and new and better ways of 
shipping goods were found, thus making transport more 
flexible and reducing its impact on trade. Therefore, 
a key issue in increasing trade flows is to develop 
infrastructure and build up the countries’ capability to 
mobilize efficient delivery services and thus reduce the 
prices of traded goods.
3.  Further results: the importance of 
infrastructure in reporting and partner 
countries
To analyse the role of the infrastructure of reporting 
and partner countries separately, a third gravity model 
was built within the same theoretical framework. The 
difference with respect to the previous models was the 
inclusion of two geographical distance variables instead 
of one: the geographical distance of the reporter (the 
five Andean members) and that of its partner.
The findings are shown in table 5. The coefficients 
for economic size and the Andean Pact and border 
dummies show more or less the same evolution, 
exactly the same sign and approximately the same 
level. Economic size continues to have a positive effect 
on trade. Similarly, the common border dummy posts 
important and significant values up to 1992, before the 
preferential agreement gained momentum.
Table 5 shows that, until 1992, the infrastructure 
of the reporting countries, i.e., the Andean Community 
members, had a larger negative effect on trade than 
the partners’ infrastructure endowments. This clearly 
indicates that in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
the lack of infrastructure and the corresponding 
disadvantage with respect to other countries in the 
region had a negative impact on the trade opportunities 
of the Andean Pact signatories. The infrastructure in 
these countries, like many others in Latin America, 
deteriorated signif icantly in the 1980s and early 
1990s, when the region lost considerable ground 
to the industrialized countries and faster-growing 
emerging economies (Calderon and Servén, 2003). The 
coefficients show that lack of infrastructure at home 
narrowed the reporting countries’ trade possibilities 
TABLE 5
Andean Pact, 1985-1995: second gravity model including infrastructure. Empirical 
results (of the reporting and partner country). Empirical results
(Standardized coefficients)
Year ln YiYj ln GeoDistance ln GeoDistance Andean Pact Border R
2 n
  Reporter Partner dummy  dummy
1985 0.782 * -0.207 * -0.179 * -0.034 0.374 * 0.687 125
1986 0.775 * -0.278 * -0.161 * -0.087 0.337 * 0.695 129
1987 0.798 * -0.243 * -0.182 * -0.017 0.327 * 0.688 131
1988 0.843 * -0.302 * -0.127 * -0.031 0.328 * 0.764 134
1989 0.802 * -0.338 * -0.135 * -0.010 0.302 * 0.704 133
1990 0.840 * -0.267 * -0.107 * 0.119 * 0.330 * 0.722 140
1991 0.841 * -0.262 * -0.142 * 0.175 * 0.295 * 0.765 132
1992 0.825 * -0.215 * -0.196 * 0.118 * 0.330 * 0.777 135
1993 0.806 * -0.199 * -0.187 * 0.154 * 0.301 * 0.795 143
1994 0.770 * -0.191 * -0.203 * 0.190 * 0.271 * 0.747 146
1995 0.750 * -0.227 * -0.211 * 0.190 * 0.220 * 0.729 151
Source: authors’ estimates.
* Significant at 5%.
10 It will be recalled that model (1) used the square root of distance, 
though this does not refute the arguments made in this paragraph.
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more than the same lack in partner countries. In 1989 
and 1990, the reporters’ infrastructures had a negative 
impact about two-and-a-half times that of partner-
country infrastructures.
Once infrastructure became an important 
government objective, transportation costs decreased 
and a greater number of more distant destinations could 
be reached for the same price. Hence, partner-country 
infrastructure gained in importance while the reporters’ 
infrastructure lost influence. The results indicate that 
the Andean countries’ major efforts to increase private-
sector involvement in infrastructure development 
were successful. Moreover, the absolute value of 
distance elasticity rises after 1990. Progress has been 
made in reducing public-sector funding shortfalls and 
improving infrastructure productivity (Estache, Wodon 
and Foster, 2002), thus making distance more flexible 
again. By 1995, the infrastructure of both countries 
was equally relevant in cost reduction and efficiency 
determination.
4.  Regional infrastructure perspectives for the 
Andean Community
Infrastructure should be considered not only as a 
key tool for integration but as a link to sustainable 
development. We will refer briefly to the state of the 
art as regards infrastructure in the Andean region. By 
discussing the traits of existing corridors and outlining 
the position regarding those with the highest apparent 
potential for development, we attempt to link our 
findings to the situation on the ground. The members 
are, in fact, beginning to adopt common measures on 
several fronts to foster intraregional trade and physical 
integration, by facilitating and deregulating to facilitate 
and deregulate transport services, electricity supply 
and telecommunications.11 Specific provisions for all 
modes of transport, including multimodal transport, 
have been made to determine the principles and criteria 
of efficient service provision.12
Growing intraregional trade in the Andean 
Community, as discussed in the previous sections, was 
followed by market concentration. Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Colombia form the country pair with 
the highest share of intraregional trade, following by 
the Colombia-Ecuador.
According to IDB (2000), trade flows in South 
America are concentrated in a few major corridors 
and associated hubs of activity, but only one of the 
six main hubs is located in the Andean Community. 
The largest flows do not take place in the Community, 
but in the Southern Cone, with Brazil, Chile and, until 
2001, Argentina occupying the main positions (see table 
6). Nevertheless, the Colombia-Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela hub, linking Bogotá to Caracas, moves more 
than 3 million tons of cargo annually and is second only 
to the Argentina-Brazil flow. Half of this cargo, which 
amounted to US$ 2.5778 billion in 1998, is transported 
by truck and half by river and maritime transport. 
There is also a 380 MW electricity transmission 
line. The Ecuador-Colombia trade flow ranks ninth, 
with US$ 856.5 million in 1998. These intraregional 
exchanges are being gradually upgraded. By 2002, 
around 50% of the goods traded were high value-added 
products and, among the remaining 50% —low value-
added products— petroleum is prominent.
This paper has discussed the conceptual issues, 
frameworks for analysis and provisions for regional 
infrastructure development being made in the Andean 
Community. As well, however, seeking a common 
strategic vision on development not only within the 
Andean region but also for all of Latin America, 
the Community joined the Regional Infrastructure 
Integration in South America (IIRSA) initiative.
TABLE 6
South America: ten main bilateral trade 
relationships, 1998
(Millions of dollars)
Bilateral trade partners Flows %
Argentina-Brazil 14 411.3 38.64
Colombia-Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 2 577.8 6.91
Argentina-Chile 2 413.5 6.47
Brazil-Chile 1 851.0 4.96
Brazil-Uruguay 1 815.6 4.87
Brazil-Paraguay 1 598.7 4.29
Brazil-Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 1 367.3 3.67
Argentina-Uruguay 1 338.1 3.59
Colombia-Ecuador 856.5 2.30
Argentina-Paraguay 751.7 2.02
Source: Interamerican Development Bank (2000).
11 See www.comunidadandina.org/servicios/trans.htm.
12 As regards overland transport, for instance, Decisions 398 
(passengers) and 399 (goods) set out the contractual terms and 
responsibilities of both carrier and user; international transport by 
road is regulated by Decision 467; Resolution 300 regulates Decision 
399 by determining the forms to be used by country authorities and 
carriers. Other important measures have been taken for maritime 
and air transport, in order to harmonize policies and make firms 
more competitive.
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IIRSA is a political and strategic regional vision 
revolving around the development of a hub encompassing 
the 12 South American countries. It represents a new 
planning approach in which countries coordinate both 
national sectoral policies and projects that are consistent 
with the policies of their regional partners. In view of 
this, the analysis of potential corridors should consider 
those in which the Andean members participate under 
the Andean Agreement as well as those linking them 
to other existing and potential trading partners in Latin 
America.
The exchange hubs channelling the largest flows 
are complemented by others which mobilize smaller 
volumes but have significant growth potential. It is 
precisely in these corridors with somewhat lower 
volumes where fresh investment may have the highest 
returns, by reducing bottlenecks and expanding 
capacity. Approaching regionalism via a framework of 
hubs and corridors helps to identify flows that could be 
stimulated by furthering integration in different areas, 
building on complementarities between economies 
and developing plans to tie other regions into the 
existing network. This approach aims to transform 
trade hubs into axes of integration and development, 
with infrastructure construed not in isolation but as 
part of a set of activities, linking —through different 
kinds of integration— physical investment with social 
dimensions of development.
Our results confirm the relevance of the above 
points and add to the motivation to pursue such 
initiatives. But there are competing options for 
infrastructure investment, ranging from local or domestic 
options (the “country cost”) to those favouring distant 
partners. From a regional development perspective, the 
preferred options would be domestic and IIRSA-related, 
whether within or outside the Community.
The operation of new free trade areas in the 
region, such as the MERCOSUR and Andean Community 
area, may change the trading map of South America. 
The evidence set forth in this paper suggests that the 
development of the hubs and corridors should form one 
of the main priorities in such agreements.
VI
Conclusions
Three different, though related, gravity models were 
examined in this paper. The f irst conf irmed the 
relevance of the Andean preferential trade agreement 
and of adjacency to the members’ trade flows. The 
second and third models also took the trade agreement 
and adjacency factors into account, but factored in 
the role of infrastructure. One model evaluated the 
general importance of reducing distance between 
bilateral partners and the other separated the effects of 
importers’ and exporters’ infrastructure endowments, in 
order to determine which had most impact in terms of 
reducing physical distance.
All the results confirmed that economic size is 
crucial to trade. Even within regional agreements, 
size determines a country’s level of bargaining power. 
When it comes to trade, States are interested in relative 
purchasing capabilities and, therefore, in the economic 
power of the others. Given that economic size cannot 
readily be modified by short-term policies, countries 
should focus first on such variables as infrastructure 
or preferential agreements to foster not only trade but 
growth as well. Nevertheless, economic size will be a 
consideration in any regional negotiation.
The first gravity model confirmed the Andean 
Community’s positive impact on trade within the region 
and with third partners. The positive evolution and low 
values of the coefficients show that the preferential 
trade agreement gained strength slowly, due to the 
complexity of the integration process and the high 
number of exceptions involved. The second model 
indicated that the preferential trade agreement became 
relevant only in the 1990s, when the free trade area 
became operational. It also showed that the impact of 
the preferential regime is greater when infrastructure 
endowments are considered. Reducing the cost and 
improving the quality of transport systems through 
infrastructure development improves international 
market access and helps to increase trade.
As the new regionalism becomes established in the 
world in general (IDB, 2002) and liberalization policies 
continue to lower trade barriers and tariffs, transport 
costs derived from poor infrastructure may come to 
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represent a much higher level of effective protection 
than tariffs do. Undoubtedly, the Andean Community 
should reformulate its approach to integration and 
set in motion appropriate mechanisms to improve its 
geopolitical stability, attract foreign direct investment, 
foster functional regional cooperation —especially in 
infrastructure— and improve its economic and political 
negotiating position vis-à-vis other groups or countries. 
But it should also foster a new type of integration aimed, 
not simply at trade measures, but also at cooperation on 
different fronts and global competitiveness. Otherwise 
the impact of its preferential agreement will be gradually 
diluted as new regional agreements lower tariffs among 
other Latin American countries. From this perspective, 
bilateral trade will ultimately be defined in terms of 
costs and competitiveness. But competitiveness can 
be achieved only through improvements in logistical 
and transport services at all points in the production-
distribution chain, and the respective reduction in costs 
brought about by a more comprehensive type of regional 
integration.
The second model also showed that the influence 
of a shared border, enabling border trade, is declining. 
As transport costs decreased and the preferential 
trade agreement became consolidated, promoting 
infrastructure development in the process, shared borders 
became less important. However, since land transport 
is the favoured mode for much of the increasing flow 
of goods and border trade is an important source of 
economic activity between neighbours, intra-Andean 
borders should be properly equipped to efficiently 
interlink national economies. This is crucial to open 
trade corridors and development hubs that connect 
interior regions of the Andean countries, through border 
regions, with Pacific and Atlantic ports. Such corridors 
will allow true crossroads to be established, building on 
their privileged geographic position as a main asset.
Here again, the evolution, sign, significance and 
values of the geographical distance variable highlighted 
infrastructure’s positive influence on trade and strongly 
suggest that, as the Andean Pact evolves into a 
more sophisticated and complex integration scheme, 
infrastructure will be the most manageable variable 
available to governments for reducing transport costs.
The results of the final gravity model, which 
considered the infrastructure of the Andean countries 
and their partners separately, show that today a 
country’s infrastructure is decisive not only as regards 
the import of goods needed locally, but also in order 
to qualify as a trading partner. Improving infrastructure 
in poor and middle income countries, like the Andean 
ones, brings high global returns in terms of trade (Brun, 
Carrère and others, 2002).
Lastly, better infrastructure should not only be 
regarded as a tool to increase trade: within the framework 
of functional cooperation among South American 
economies, it should be considered as a major driver 
of development, enabling the region as a whole to gain 
in competitiveness and become an attractive partner for 
other, more distant locations.
APPENDIX
The infrastructure index
Several approaches to building an infrastructure index have 
been employed by different authors. Owen (1987) graded 
countries in terms of infrastructure by using a linear average 
of several infrastructure measures, establishing a value of 100 
for one country and relating the others to it. Hulten (1996) 
chose to normalize individual measures of infrastructure in 
quartiles. He then assigned a value to each of the ordered 
quartiles and, from these infrastructure rankings, constructed 
an index by taking simple averages (Calderón and Chong, 
2004). Limão and Venables (2001) built an index from four 
variables: kilometres of road, of paved highways, and of 
railways per square kilometre of country area, and telephone 
mainlines per person. Factor components were used to 
normalize the variables and a Cobb Douglas production 
function was employed. The authors —like others employing 
similar methods— stated that the normalization did not 
affect the results in general terms. Martinez-Zarzoso and 
Nowak-Lehmann (2002) used the same four infrastructure 
variables but normalized only the variable of telephone lines 
per 1,000 people, obtaining a simple average infrastructure 
index per country.
The index used in his work was calculated on the basis 
of five infrastructure variables: the four used by Limão and 
Venables (2001) plus kilowatts of electricity generating 
capacity. Usually, quantity variables are normalized to make 
them independent of country size; hence, telephone mainlines 
and kilowatts of electricity were divided by population, 
and roads, paved roads and railways were normalized by 
square kilometers of country area. This procedure was 
inspired by Canning, who proposed normalizing rival goods 
by population, on the basis that the quantity of the good 
divided by population indicates average consumption.13 For 
13 A good is rival in nature when the use of that good by one agent 
precludes the simultaneous use of the same goods by other agents. 
(See “Non-rival productivity inputs”, available at: www.hassler-j.iies.
su.se/Courses/macro/2000/growth3.pdf).
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non-rival goods, however, normalizing by population does 
not give average per capita consumption, since an increase 
in population does not reduce average consumption with a 
fixed stock of non-rival infrastructure. Hence, it makes sense 
to normalize transportation infrastructure data by area, as 
Ingram and Liu (1997) and Limão and Venables (2001) did 
—and as we have done.
The rationale for including kilowatts of electricity 
was that electricity contributes to economic activities in 
general and is crucial for telecommunications, computers 
and machinery. Also, most activities rely on electricity at 
(at least) one point in the transport and trade process, such 
as port operation and data processing. Moreover, proper 
electrification along roads allows safe and efficient movement 
of cargo, especially at night, when most road transport take 
place in the Andean countries.
Ports and airport data which, in any case, represent 
a small share of overall infrastructure endowments, were 
excluded owing to a lack of comparable data across countries 
and over a sufficient period of time. For similar reasons, power 
refers only to electricity. Moreover, the analysis incorporates 
only quantitative stocks rather than qualitative measures, since 
there is almost no data on operational efficiency.
The final index is a linear average of the five normalized 
infrastructure variables, calculated for each country in the 
sample for the period 1985-1995. Index values for the 
countries for which regressions were calculated are available 
from the authors. As noted, normalization of the infrastructure 
variables eliminates the size effect; hence, small countries 
with well-developed infrastructure, such as Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Japan, rank high, even though in absolute 
terms their kilometres of roads or numbers of telephones 
appear to indicate a less developed infrastructure.
(Original: English)
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